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the expenditure of capital to where it will have the greatest
impact. A number of methods for determining such rates
have been proposed with a view to helping with this decision
making. Unfortunately, such methods sometimes tend
towards anecdote, might be part of a marketing campaign, or
lack the context needed to drive truly informed decisions.
We propose a taxonomy to classify incidents of the
loss of control over sensitive information. The taxonomy is
hierarchical in nature, allowing for incidents to be classified
with a level of precision appropriate to the amount of
information available. Analysis of incidents using the
taxonomy may also use the level of specificity that is
appropriate given the question at hand and data available.
We then explore the proportion of breach types in a subset of
data losses accumulated by the Identity Theft Resource
Center. Using the 2002 North American Industry
Classification System ("NAICS"), we classify breach events
according to the industry sector in which they occurred.
We conclude that the taxonomy is useful and that
analysis of incidents by type and industry yields results that
can be instructive to practitioners who need to understand
how and where breaches are actually occurring. For
example, the Health Care and Social Assistance sector
reported a larger than average proportion of lost and stolen
computing hardware, but reported an unusually low
proportion of compromised hosts. Educational Services
reported a disproportionately large number of compromised
hosts, while insider conduct and lost and stolen hardware
were well below the proportion common to the set as a
whole. Public Administration's proportion of compromised
host reports was below average, but their proportion of
processing errors was well above the norm. The Finance and
Insurance sector experienced the smallest overall proportion
of processing errors, but the highest proportion of insider
misconduct. Other sectors showed no statistically significant
difference from the average, either due to a true lack of
variance, or due to an insignificant number of samples for
the statistical tests being used.
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PART I: A TAXONOMY OF DATA LOSSES
I. INTRODUCTION
The protection of personal information has become serious
business. Over the last few years, consumers have become
increasingly aware of the risk of fraud from a third party's misuse of
personal information ("identity theft"). In response to this risk, state
legislatures have enacted "breach notification" laws that require
information about the loss of personal information to be reported to
the affected parties. Meanwhile, organizations with personal
information about their customers, employees, and business partners
are trying to understand the most effective ways to protect personal
information.
Privacy, risk, and security officers need to understand the means
by which sensitive personal information is lost. With breaches now
often being reported publicly, many details are available, but no clear
picture of what is really happening emerges. Worse, advocates of one
defense over another cherry-pick the data to support their
conclusions. Before we can solve the problem of data loss, we need to
understand just what the problem is. In particular, we want to know
how data loss happens and where data loss happens.
Our objective is to create a simple means of classifying the loss of
sensitive information so that such losses can be assessed even when
details are sketchy. Knowing the general means by which the loss
occurred and the context of the loss is often achievable even with the
limited amount of information published in data loss notifications.
Ultimately, the methodology developed should help organizations do a
better job of maintaining control of the sensitive information in their
care.
Information security programs are put in place by organizations of
all types with the hope that these programs will properly protect and
manage information, thus supporting the trustworthiness of the
organizations' brands. At the heart of many programs is a list of
controls, 1 often specified in standards such as the ISO/IEC
27001:20052 and ISO/IEC 27002:2005,3 or regulations such as the
' By -controls," we refer to mechanisms to protect against a weakness or vulnerability.
Administrative defenses such as policy and education are included, as are technical
defenses like cryptography and network firewalls.
2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY-
SECURITY TECHNIQUES-INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-REQUIREMENTS.
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") 4
Security Rule5 and the Safeguards Rule6 for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act of 1999 ("GLBA").7
Management of information security often becomes a matter of
assessing risks against relevant standards and remediating "control
gaps."8 The efficacy of the controls is sometimes taken as a matter of
gospel by inexperienced practitioners. Even where practitioners
consider the importance of some controls over others, decisions often
rely on anecdote and the experience of individual practitioners.
The management and protection of personal information is, in
many cases, a matter broader than the visibility and responsibility of
an organization's information security department, falling into the
domain of a chief privacy officer or similar official. Here, we present a
taxonomy of incidents resulting in the potential exposure of personal
information, intended to help privacy officials classify failures to
protect personal information so they can be studied, compared, and
prevented in the future.
II. RELATED WORK
Some attempts have been made to focus deployment of controls
into areas of greatest value. Since the time of the 1988 Morris Worm,
earnest attempts have been made to understand security on the
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 27001:2005, http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm (type
the standard number in the search box).
3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY-
SECURITY TECHNIQUES-CODE OF PRACTICE FOR INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 27002: 2005 [hereinafter CODE OF PRACTICE],
http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm (type the standard number in the search box).
4 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 11o Stat.
1936 (1996).
5 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2007),
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SecurityStandard/Downloads/securityfinalrule.pdf.
6 FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2007).
7 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. lO6-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (2006) (codified as
amended in 29 U.S.C. § 2903 and scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., and
18 U.S.C.).
8 "Control gaps" refer to the differences between the controls in place within an
organization and the framework against which the organization is being assessed.
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Internet. 9 These attempts have focused generally on incidents
reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination
Center ("CERT/CC") at the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie
Mellon University.
Other research has been conducted in the area of vulnerability.
The most comprehensive collection comes from CERT/CC, which has
published statistics, such as vulnerability remediation, incident
reports received, and vulnerability advisories published. 1° Some of
this work has been taken over by the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team ("US-CERT"). Similar work has been
undertaken to study Internet privacy, particularly Web privacy, which
has helped to show how systems fail and how to avoid repeating the
mistakes of the past.1"
Broader attempts to manage risk through focus of controls in
organizations, without regard to Internet connectivity, have also been
made. Examples include the National Institute of Standards and
Technology's ("NIST") Risk Management method, which puts controls
deployment in the context of exploit probability and impact around
threat-vulnerability pairs, 12 and the Operationally Critical Threat,
Asset, and Vulnerability EvaluationsM ("OCTAVEsM") Method's
assessment of infrastructure vulnerabilities as they relate to critical
assets.13 Even with such focus, organizations often choose which
controls to use based, not on objective assessment of actual incidents,
but solely on the persuasiveness of those making the arguments.
Additionally, studies have been executed to analyze security
incidents within particular industries. For example, Adam Dodge has
9 Thomas A. Longstaff et al., Security of the Internet, in 15 THE GROEHLICH/KENT
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 231, 231-55 (Marcel Dekker ed., 1997), available
at http://www.cert.org/encyc-article/tocencyc.html.
10 CERT Coordination Center, Full Statistics (April 30, 2007),
http://www.cert.org/stats/fullstats.htnl.
- See, e.g., MATrHEW CURTIN, DEVELOPING TRUST: ONLINE PRIVACY AND SECURITY (Apress
2001).
12 GARY STONEBURNER, ALICE GOGUEN & ALEXIS FERINGA, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS (NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. SPEC.
PUBLICATION 800-30) (July 2002), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/8oo-
30/sp8oo-30.pdf.
13 CHRISTOPHER J. ALBERTS, AUDREY J. DOROFEE & JULIA H. ALLEN, CARNEGIE MELLON,
OCTAVEM CATALOG OF PRACTICES, VERSION 2.0 (2001),
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/oltro2o.pdf.
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produced reports that examine the information security incidents that
have occurred at colleges and universities for the years 200614 and
2007.15
III. ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL DATA CONTROL Loss INCIDENTS
We propose that analysis of data control loss incidents should be
made more formal. Most significantly, we propose consideration of
data control loss incidents over anecdotes and hypothetical weakness.
We have a variety of questions we would like to be able to assess
scientifically: (1) What types of failures occur? (2) What are the
failure rates of various controls? (3) What is the impact of their
failure? (4) Are lists of controls produced for one industry relevant to
another? (5) Are controls used to protect one type of information
useful to protect another? Our taxonomy seeks to establish a common
language needed to discuss these questions.
IV. METHOD
Assessment of control loss failure requires a set of data with
sufficient information to allow the assessor to understand which
control failed. Failure of a particular control is better understood
when put into a specific context, such as the nature of the organization
that suffered the failure.
A. CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURE
Our present work is specifically focused on failures that result in
the loss of control over sensitive information, and understanding how
such failures vary among industries. We begin with a hierarchical
view of the types of failure that lead to loss of control over such
information. This hierarchy allows for accurate representation of
control failures even given information of variable precision, as would
likely be the case where various organizations are self-reporting.
Although some losses have historically been reported directly and
openly, others are described in vague terms.
14 ADAM DODGE, EDUCATIONAL SECURITY INCIDENTS (ESI) YEAR IN REVIEW-2006 (2007),
http://www.adamdodge.com/esi/yir_2oo6 (follow attachment hyperlink).
15 ADAM DODGE, EDUCATIONAL SECURITY INCIDENTS (ESI) YEAR IN REVIEW-200 7 (2008),
http://www.adamdodge.com/esi/year-review_2007 (follow attachment hyperlink).
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We break all failures into three categories: physical, logical, and
procedural. From there, we specialize further, usually down two
layers. We describe each category of the taxonomy here. A succinct
representation can be found in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Diagram of Data Control Loss Taxonomy
20o8)
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A- Physical Failure
Failures in the physical category are those in which control was
unintentionally lost over a physical asset containing sensitive
information.
At- Documentation
Loss of control over documentation includes paper or other
physical representations of sensitive information. This could
come about from a physical break-in and theft of documents.
A2- Media
Loss of control over media is where the data are in electronic
form for use by a computing device, but where the computing
device is not part of what was lost.
A2a- Portable Media
The portable media category addresses readily-
accessible media such as CD-ROMs. Someone with
basic computer-usage skills would likely be able to read
the files from the device.
A2b- Hard Drive
In this category, we refer to fixed hard disk drive
("HDD") storage. In this category, the HDD is separate
from the computer itself.
A2c- Data Tape
Tapes are separate from portable media because
reading a tape generally requires special equipment
and expertise. While portable media is intended for
easy interoperability among systems, tapes are
optimized for writing and restoration from a known
environment; interoperability is not generally a design
concern.
A3- Hardware
This category includes all types of computing devices with
sensitive data on their connected storage facilities.
A3a- Portable Digital Assistant ("PDA")
PDAs are the most mobile of computing devices. The
category includes smartphones. Generally, these
devices have limited storage and computing power, as
well as limited security. Information on them tends to
be readily accessible.
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A3b- Laptop
Laptop computers tend to have significant storage
potential-dozens of gigabytes at least-and computing
power. Security can be better than on PDAs, but in
practice, cryptographic controls are rarely used and the
information is easily accessible. Passwords typically
are in place, making access to the data a matter of
reading the disk from another machine.
A3c- Non-Portable Computer
Any other computer not designed for mobility falls into
this category. This includes desktops and servers.
B- Logical Failure
Logical failures are those where access to sensitive information was
granted through intentional action, but without giving access to the
physical asset housing the data. Exposure of the sensitive information
might or might not have been the objective of the action.
B4- Insider Action
This category includes instances where someone with
legitimate access intentionally abuses access to sensitive
information, thus causing a loss of control.
B4a- Employee
Generally, the most damaging type of failure occurs
where control over sensitive information is lost by
means of a person in a trusted position within the
organization- a direct employee.
B4b- Contractor, Partner, Vendor
Control failures that come from outsiders who have a
business relationship with the organization fall into
this category. Thus, a degree of access is likely proper
and supported by contractual agreements.
B4c- Customer, Consumer, Student
Finally, outsiders with proximity to the organization
can sometimes cause control failures.
B5- Compromise
We identify a loss of control of sensitive information that
results from the exploitation of a vulnerability in an
information system as a compromise.
20o8]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
C- Procedural Failure
Procedural failures result from a data custodian mishandling sensitive
information, publishing it to an inappropriate audience.
C6- Processing Error
Legitimate and normal business activity can lead to errors that
result in a loss of control over sensitive information. These
exposures fall into the category of processing errors.
C6a- Mailing, Envelope, Post Card
Sensitive information can be exposed by printing it in a
visible location, such as on a post card, on the outside
of an envelope, or on a part of a document visible
through an envelope window.
C6b- Website
When sensitive information is published in a file on a
Website, leaving it open for download, we classify an
exposure to be in this category. In this case, the
information is readily available and is subject to
indexing, caching, and archival by third parties.
C6c- Misprinted or Misdelivered Document
Sending a document by fax to the wrong party, putting
a document in the wrong envelope, or misdirecting e-
mail sometimes exposes sensitive information.
C7- Disposal
Improper disposal of information or the media that store it
lead to exposure of this type.
C7a- Discarded or Abandoned
This category includes exposure resulting from
instances where sensitive information is carelessly
"thrown away." This includes records thrown into the
trash without first being shredded.
C7b- Unsecured Surplus
Computer equipment being released though a surplus
process that does not include "sanitization" of the
media can lead to exposure of sensitive information.
Desks and filing cabinets containing paperwork with
sensitive information also fall into this category.
1Vol. 4:3
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B. CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRY
Understanding how failures relate to one another comes from
understanding the context of those failures. Context is easily
determined by the industry of the affected organization, which allows
for comparisons among industries. Efficacy of controls, or groups of
controls, can be compared; as different industries manage
information differently, lessons in the use of controls learned early in
one industry-say, financial services-could well be applied to others,
such as health care. Other studies could be possible by making
classifications within a particular industry, including the effects of
regulation.
The United States used the Standard Industrial Classification
("SIC") system since the 1930s to analyze business activity in the U.S.
economy and to make comparisons among industries.16 That system
has since been replaced by the North American Industry Classification
System ("NAICS"). 17 The U.S. Economic Classification Policy
Committee, Statistics Canada, and Mexico's Instituto Nacional de
Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica jointly developed the standard.18
Hierarchical classifications of industries, like the NAICS, could be
beneficial in allowing for analysis of data at various levels of precision:
high-level views could be established based on the top-level (two-
digit) NAICS classification, and more detailed industry views (full six-
digit) would allow for comparison of different sections of an industry.
Variable precision would also be advantageous, as excessive precision
would reduce the number of observations per classification down into
statistical insignificance.
16 ESTHER PEARCE, ExECuTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF STATISTICAL
STANDARDS, HISTORY OF THE STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION (1957),
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/sichist.htm.
17 North American Industry Classification System-Revision for 2007, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,532
(Mar. 16, 2oo6), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/fedreg/20o6/o516o6_naics.pdf.
18 U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS),
Introduction, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
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V. DISCUSSION
Data for this sort of analysis has historically been difficult to find
as many organizations will not report when control failures take place.
Recent changes in the legal environment of the United States,
beginning with California's breach notification law19 (most commonly
referred to by its bill number, S.B. 1386), has led to a significant
increase in the number of publicly-reported incidents.
These breach notices are helpful in raising consumer awareness
with regard to the threat of fraud stemming from identity theft.
Additional utility should come from the analysis of such information
to establish areas where efforts to protect personal information are
failing and areas where controls should be deployed. Such analysis
might well show that organizations are structurally ill-equipped to
protect the information in their care. Information security
departments are often viewed as a group within information
technology, even though the department reports to management in
finance, risk management, or audit. Realignment of the organization's
resources might be required to put effective controls in place.
A. METHODS TO CLASSIFY FAILURE
One sort of analysis might view data through the prism of an
information security controls framework. We believe that, for the
purpose of understanding how control loss incidents have taken place,
this would present an incomplete view. We will consider an
alternative here.
Where the controls framework used for assessment is hierarchical,
as is true with ISO/IEC 27002, failures may be categorized according
to some defined level of precision. For example, consider the
hierarchy of controls around media handling from the ISO/IEC
27002,20 shown in Table 1.
20 CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 3.
19 S.B. 1386, 2002 Leg. (Cal. 2002) (codified at Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82 (West 1998 & Supp.
2008)).
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Number Title
10 Communications and operations management
10.6 Network security management
10.7 Media handling
10.7.1 Management of removable media
10.7.2 Disposal of media
10.7.3 Information handling procedures
10.7.4 Security of system documentation
10.8 Exchange of information
10.8.1 Information exchange policies and procedures
Table 1: ISO 27002 Controls Around Media Handling
In the event of an information security failure caused by the loss of
a backup tape, the problem can quickly be identified as a failure at
control 10.7. Suppose that more specific information is known: that
the problem came from a failure to control access to the tape when
moving it from one location to another. The failure then could be
correctly identified at 10.7.1- a more precise specification of the type
of media-handling failure. Suppose now that less information is
known, perhaps where it is unclear whether the loss came from the
handling of media (10.7), management of network security (1o.6), or
an error in the information exchange policy with a business partner
(1O.8.1). This case would thus best be classified as a failure at the level
of communications and operations management (1o). With such a
system, we can always ensure accuracy given the precision of
information available.
Herein lies the problem: the mechanism of actual incidents is
often a combination of issues at various levels. For example, when the
State of Ohio lost a backup tape, the state's Inspector General noted
several types of failures. These included inappropriate mechanisms
for the handling of sensitive information (ISO/IEC 27002, section
9.2.5), allowance of untrained employees to handle sensitive
information (ISO/IEC 27002, sections 8.1.1 and 8.2.2), response to
the theft (ISO/IEC 27002, section 13.2.1), and the storage of sensitive
information in an unsecured folder (ISO/IEC 27002, section 11.6.1).21
21 THoMAs P. CHARLES, STATE OF OHIO OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION (July 2oo7), http://watchdog.ohio.gov/investigations/2oo719o.pdf.
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Classification of this one incident, therefore, would mean generalizing
to a level of uselessness to maintain accuracy. The only workable
alternative would be to track multiple failures for a particular
incident.
With the taxonomy that we have proposed, the entire incident falls
into one category, Physical Failure: Media: Data Tape (A2c). Such a
classification scheme is more suitable for the sort of analysis of data
control loss incidents across organizations and across industries.
B. METHODS TO CLASSIFY CONTEXT
Classification by industry is not the only means of determining
context for an incident. Two other options that we considered include
classification by region and classification by information type.
Ultimately, we determined that, for our purposes, classification by
industry was the most appropriate. However, other studies might
benefit from one of these alternatives.
1. CLASSIFICATION BY REGION
Classification of control failure by region could be accomplished in
a variety of ways, depending on the needs of the study. For example, a
multinational organization might want to understand where to
prioritize its remediation activities; analyzing control failure in a
particular country could help the organization to prioritize its
remediation activities in a manner that best addresses the unique
cultural, legal, and technical issues in that country. Similar analysis
could be made to compare across trade blocs like the European Union
or North America.
With an understanding of where actual control failures most often
happen, a multinational organization might decide to reorganize its
information processing functions away from those regions since
addressing the specific control failures head-on may ultimately be a
less cost-effective option to provide proper protection of information.
This sort of analysis seems available only to multinational
organizations that can work with their own control failure data. We
are unaware of any significant compilation of control failure data
across national boundaries.
2. CLASSIFICATION BY INFORMATION TYPE
Studying control failures by the type of affected information could
shed light on ways in which different types of information are exposed
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when things go wrong. An organization looking to give special
attention to particular types of information could then consider
whether the organization depends on controls that are known to fail at
an unacceptably high rate and whether sufficient secondary controls
are in place to protect against such failure.
While some correlation between information type and industry
classification might exist, following information type would allow for a
different sort of analysis. For example, if the exposure of a medical
record is reported by a hospital, the industry reported would be quite
different from a medical record exposed by an information service
provider working for the hospital. In both cases, however, it is a
medical record that has been exposed.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The immediate next step is to produce an analysis of a set of
incident data using the taxonomy in order to determine whether the
taxonomy is sufficient for classification of incidents and ultimately to
assess the incidents against one another.
We hope that organizations, such as the Identity Theft Resource
Center, US-CERT, and the International Association of Privacy
Professionals ("IAPP"), that have an interest in promoting effective
methods to keep sensitive information confidential will use the
taxonomy as a means of discussing incidents that fall within their
various areas of focus.
Privacy and security officers in particular would do well to
encourage their organizations to release information regarding data
control loss incidents in such a manner that will allow for proper
classification of incidents. We believe that this taxonomy will allow
for disclosure of such information in a way that is beneficial for
classification while protecting organizations from further risk through
the publication of specific vulnerabilities to potentially hostile actors.
More ready and specific classification of incidents in a standardized
system will aid in the understanding of actual events and ultimately
promote better risk management.
58320o8]
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PART II: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE YEARS OF BREACH
REPORTS BY BREACH TYPE AND INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence suggests that budgets for information security have been
on the increase.22 Even so, there are not enough resources to address
all plausible threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information. With limited resources, trade-offs must be made:
increased expenditure for controls in one area necessarily means the
loss of options in others. In order for organizations to make
economically sound security trade-offs, they must first understand the
prevalence and severity of the threats and vulnerabilities that face
their particular organizations.
Though the need for accurate information is clear, the guidance
available to the relevant decision maker is routinely of questionable
value. Anecdote and personal opinion are in wide circulation. Many
studies lack context, focusing on a single type of failure or a single
class of control, without relating them to the bigger picture. Even
more suspect is the propaganda disseminated by vendors of control
services, applications, and appliances whose principal motivation is
sales; the propaganda is designed to focus an audience's attention on
the very threat or vulnerability that the vendor's product was designed
to address. Such propaganda provides little or no guidance to
organizations that are attempting to prioritize efforts to protect the
information they possess.
While the severity of threats and vulnerabilities, and the
corresponding risks that they may pose, are subject to debate, when
these risks become concrete in the form of a breach, we are provided
with a much clearer data point. This is not to say that breach reports
provide unequivocal information or a total picture of a compromise.
Many breach reports fail to provide a complete understanding of the
threat agent. The nature of the vulnerability, however, is usually
made far clearer. In fact, often a breach report results from merely
detecting a vulnerability, even when there is no known case of a threat
having exploited it. Some announcements may withhold information
on the threat and vulnerability, opting instead simply to detail the
compromised data.
22 ROBERT RICHARDSON, COMPUTER SEC. INST., 2008 CSI COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY
SURVEY 8 (2008), http://i.empnet.com/v2.gocsi.com/pdf/CSIsurvey2oo8.pdf.
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The absence of a breach notification is not the same as the absence
of a breach. Some incidents are never detected. A compromise that is
detected internally may not be communicated to the larger public,
either because the likelihood of a threat having exploited a
vulnerability is deemed too unlikely, or because the organization
determines that it would rather accept the consequences of a lack of
disclosure than the additional expenditure that might result from
publicizing a compromise.
Though breach notices provide imperfect information, it is
possible to devise a method that effectively handles information of
varying precision, allowing us to glean valuable information contained
in imperfect notices. In Part I: A Taxonomy of Data Losses,23 we
attempted to provide a foundation for the discovery of quantitative
knowledge about the nature, distribution, and frequency of security
breaches- knowledge that could help inform those responsible for
applying information security dollars about the relative control gaps
they may need to address.
In this part, we apply the taxonomy to a real world data set in
order to gain insight into the frequency of various data breaches.
Then we apply that insight to determine whether there are significant
differences in the occurrence of different types of breaches between
industries.
We have undertaken an in-depth analysis of a limited set of data
breaches- those that pose a threat to the confidentiality of personally
identifying information, or data that might lead to the threat of
identity theft. While this type of failure is not the only sort that
interests information assurance practitioners, the growing body of
state and federal legislation, and the motivation to make these
breaches public, means a greater number of samples are available for
review.
1I. METHODS
To perform this analysis, we used data describing individual
security breaches. These breaches were first separated by type; then,
each organization or entity with first-order responsibility for the data
that was compromised was categorized by industry. Data were
subjected to standard analytical methods, including tests for statistical
significance, to uncover whether discernible trends exist within and
between industries.
23 See Part I, supra.
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A. DATA
Data for this analysis were drawn from a collection of breach
reports collected by the Identity Theft Resource Center ("ITRC").
ITRC describes itself as "a nonprofit, nationally respected
organization dedicated exclusively to the understanding and
prevention of identity theft."24 The ITRC provides consumer and
victim support as well as public education. 25 It also advises
governmental agencies, legislators, law enforcement, and businesses
about the evolving and growing problem of identity theft.26
ITRC has published breach reports for 2005,27 2006,28 2007,29 and
2oo8.30 We have limited the scope of this project to the years 2005
through 2007. This data set is by no means intended to give complete
coverage of all information security breaches during the sample
period. In keeping with its mission, ITRC focuses its attention on
those breaches occurring in the United States that pose a risk for
identity theft, which they define as "a crime in which an impostor
obtains key pieces of personal identifying information ("PII") such as
Social Security numbers and driver's license numbers and uses them
for their own personal gain."3'
Information included in the breach reports was chosen solely at
the discretion of ITRC, and, as stated in the description of the 2007
report, the only breaches published in the report are from "real and
credible" sources.
24 Identity Theft Resource Center, http://www.idtheftcenter.org (last visited Feb. 13,
2009).
25MId.
26M.
27 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2005 DISCLOSURES OF U.S. DATA INCIDENTS (2OO6),
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%2oBreach%2oReport%202005.pdf.
28 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2006 DIsCLOSuREs OF U.S. DATA INCIDENTS (2007),
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%2oBreach%2oReport%202oo6.pdf.
29 IDENTTY THEFT RES. CTR., 2007 BREACH LIST (2008),
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%2oBreach%2oReport%202007.pdf.
30 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2008 BREACH LIST (2008),
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/TRC%2oBreach%2oReport%202oo8.pdf.
31 Identity Theft Resource Center, supra note 24.
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Breach report data were entered into a spreadsheet for analysis.
In some instances a single breach report cited more than one breach
incident. Where possible, we separated the report into multiple
observations.
B. TAXONOMY
We labeled each entry in the data set using the nomenclature set
out in Part I: A Taxonomy of Data Losses. The hierarchical
structure 2 allows us to classify information breaches to the level of
precision available in the published reports.
We used the textual descriptions of the breaches contained in the
ITRC sources to categorize the data. When it was not possible to gain
enough information from the description to categorize the breach to at
least the second level of the hierarchy, we consulted the original
sources. When this did not provide enough information, we
performed a Web search in an attempt to uncover more information.
If these efforts failed, we labeled the breach to the level of precision
possible. Further analyses of the breach descriptions may be
undertaken as the taxonomy matures. For example, if all that was
known about a breach is that information was compromised during a
break-in, we labeled that breach to the first level: an instance of "A:
Physical Failure." However, if we knew the burglar took several
laptop computers containing unencrypted, sensitive data, we labeled
that at the third level: "A3b: Lost or Stolen Laptop."
While the entries were scored to the degree of precision allowed by
the breach notification, for the purposes of this analysis we have
focused on the second level in the taxonomy hierarchy. Those entries
that could be distinguished only to the first level were excluded from
analysis, and those that were precise to the third level or deeper were
grouped together by their second level.
Part I presents a complete discussion of the taxonomy. Briefly, the
levels considered here are:
At: Lost or Stolen Documentation, labeled in figures
and tables as Docs.
A2: Lost or Stolen Digital Media, labeled in figures
and tables as Media.
A3: Lost or Stolen Computing Hardware, labeled in
figures and tables as Hardware.
32 See Figure 1 in Part I, supra.
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B4: Insider Misconduct, labeled in figures and tables
as Insider.
B5: Compromised Host, labeled in figures and tables
as Compromise.
C6: Insecure Surplussing, labeled in figures and
tables as Processing.
C7: Discarded Data, labeled in figures and tables as
Disposal.
C. INDUSTRY
Rather than risk introducing bias by introducing our own scheme,
we chose the 2002 North American Industry Classification System
("NAICS") 33 as our means for analyzing breach distribution by
industry. Though a newer version of NAICS was released in 2007, the
greater availability of NAICS 2002 data in free sources led us to use
the older classification. A best effort was made to identify the NAICS
code of the organization responsible for the data exposed in each
breach in our data set. Each observation was then labeled with the
first two digits of the code, representing the broadest distinction
between industrial sectors. The twenty broad sectors of the NAICS
are:
11: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting
21: Mining
22: Utilities
23: Construction
31-33: Manufacturing
42: Wholesale Trade
44-45: Retail Trade
48-49: Transportation and Warehousing
51: Information
52: Finance and Insurance
53: Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
54: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
55: Management of Companies and Enterprises
56: Administrative and Support and Waste
Management and Remediation Services
61: Educational Services
62: Health Care and Social Assistance
33 U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Codes and Titles (Nov. 13, 2002),
http://www.census.gov/epcd/naicso2/naicodo2.htm.
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71: Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
72: Accommodation and Food Services
81: Other Services
92: Public Administration
III. RESULTS
Over the three years of ITRC data, we cataloged 925 observations.
Some of these were presented in the breach lists as a single notice that
described multiple distinct incidents. These were separated into
different observations. Only 905 observations could be classified to
the second level. Five entries were unclassifiable; they noted only that
a breach had occurred that required some form of credit monitoring
or other corrective action. Fifteen entries could be classified only to
the first level, one fell into the A category, thirteen in B, and one in
category C. Of the 905 classifiable observations, six did not have
enough information about the responsible organization to be assigned
a NAICS code. The 899 remaining observations are detailed in Table
2. Figure 2 shows another view of the distribution of observations.
While most NAICS codes were represented in the data, there were no
observations for codes 11 (Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and
Hunting), 42 (Wholesale Trade), and 55 (Management of Companies
and Enterprises), so these are excluded from all tables, figures, and
analysis.
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I.
Industry I
21: Agriculture
22: Mining
23: Utilities
31-33: Manufacturing
44-45: Retail
48-49: Transportation
51: Information
52: Finance
53: Real Estate
54: Prof. Services
56: Admin. Services
61: Educational
62: Health Care
71: Arts
72: Accommodation
81: Other Services
92: Public Admin.
Total 38 86 262 56 194 199 64 899
Table 2: Breach Type Observations by Industry
Figure 2: Breach Type Observations by Industry
-- Total
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
1 2 16 2 7 4 0 32
2 0 9 1 16 2 4 34
0 2 1 1 1 2 0 7
0 3 11 5 12 10 0 41
6 16 32 12 16 14 11 1070 0 1 0 0 1 2 4
1 2 16 2 5 2 2 30
1 0 5 1 0 4 2 13
9 15 49 9 101 75 8 266
8 12 52 9 5 1 12 115
0 0 0 0 2 0 1 3
0 1 2 3 3 0 4 13
2 2 4 1 1 2 0 12
8 29 62 10 25 65 18 217
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A. DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS
To test the hypothesis that a significant difference exists in the
distribution of breach types between industries, we assumed the
opposite, generating a table of expected observations for each breach
type by industry (Table 3). We calculated each cell in this "expected"
table by taking the product of the total number of observations in that
industry and the percentage of that specific breach type across all
industries. Taking each industry in turn we then performed a X2 test 34
for statistical significance, comparing the observed distribution of
breach types against the expected values. P-values resulting from
those tests are detailed in Table 4.
E
o -oo ") c E
Industry U
21: Agriculture 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
22: Mining 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1
23: Utilities 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1
31-33: Manufacturing 1.4 3.1 9.3 2.0 6.9 7.1 2.3
44-45: Retail 1.4 3.3 9.9 2.1 7.3 7.5 2.4
48-49: Transportation 0.3 0.7 2.0 0.4 1.5 1.5 0.5
51: Information 1.7 3.9 11.9 2.6 8.8 9.1 2.9
52: Finance 4.5 10.2 31.2 6.7 23.1 23.7 7.6
53: Real Estate 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.3
54: Prof. Services 1.3 2.9 8.7 1.9 6.5 6.6 2.1
56: Admin. Services 0.5 1.2 3.8 0.8 2.8 2.9 0.9
61: Educational 11.2 25.4 77.5 16.6 57.4 58.9 18.9
62: Health Care 4.9 11.0 33.5 7.2 24.8 25.5 8.2
71: Arts 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.2
72: Accommodation 0.5 1.2 3.8 0.8 2.8 2.9 0.9
81: Other Services 0.5 1.1 3.5 0.7 2.6 2.7 0.9
92: Public Admin. 9.2 20.8 63.2 13.5 46.8 48.0 15.4
Table 3: Expected Values
34 A X2 test is a standard test to approximate the degree to which observations in a
contingency table are independent of one another. Put another, less precise way, the test
gives us an indication of how likely it is that each observation in a table was placed into a
category at random.
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21: Agriculture .8760759196
22: Mining .4832063360
23: Utilities .5512226506
31-33: Manufacturing .1817398353
44-45: Retail .0034487983
48-49: Transportation .5437545766
51: Information .2034512769
52: Finance .0157029420
53: Real Estate .0612124637
54: Prof. Services .1271919999
56: Admin. Services .3659340107
61: Educational .0000000001
62: Health Care .0000096276
71: Arts .2484658204
72: Accommodation .0022826685
81: Other Services .3049347667
92: Public Admin. .0018734368
Table 4: 2 P-Value by Industry
A decision crucial to our analysis was the selection of a p-value for
our tests of statistical significance. The p-value is the probability,
assuming the truth of a hypothesis (typically a null hypothesis),35 of
generating a distribution at least as extreme as the observed
distribution. This is a standard method for determining the
"statistical significance" of the observed set of data. We are not aware
of a body of work in Information Assurance that sets a standard for
statistical significance. Since the threshold of p = o.o5 is common
across many disciplines, we use that here.
Strictly speaking, six of the seventeen observed industries satisfied
our p-value requirement for significance. To address risk of Type II
errors36 in the X2 analysis, we exclude industries that have fewer than
five breaches of a particular type. While the p-values for codes 44-45
(Retail Trade) and 72 (Accommodation and Food Services) pass our
minimum standard, they both show a majority of cells with values
below 5. This leaves us with codes 52 (Finance and Insurance), 61
35 A "null hypothesis" is a hypothesis intended to be refuted. Our null hypothesis is that
"there is no difference in the distribution of breach types across industries." By finding
little evidence for the null hypothesis we become correspondingly more confident in the
"alternate" hypothesis.
36 A "Type II error," also known as a "false negative," is a rejection of a correct hypothesis.
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(Educational Services), 62 (Health Care and Social Assistance), and 92
(Public Administration) as subjects for our analysis.
Table 5 and Figure 3 show the percentage of each breach type
within our four subject industries, as well as for all observations
collectively.
0
0 0
Industry __ 0_f Q_ _
All Industries 4.23 9.57 29.14 6.23 21.58 22.14 7.12
52: Finance 5.61 14.95 29.91 11.21 14.95 13.08 10.28
61: Educational 3.38 5.64 18.42 3.38 37.97 28.20 3.01
62: Health Care 6.96 10.43 45.22 7.83 4.35 14.78 10.43
92: Public Admin. 3.69 13.36 28.57 4.61 11.52 29.95 8.29
Table 5: Breach Type Percentages by Industry
Figure 3: Breach Type Percentage by Industry
Table 6 shows the distribution of all observations after
consolidating all low p-value industries into a catch-all category. We
ran a X2 test on each column, comparing each breach type in turn to
Table 7, which contains our expected values. Table 8 contains the p-
value results of those tests. The results show a high degree of
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significance for lost and stolen media and hardware, insider
misconduct, compromised hosts, processing errors, and insecure
disposal. Only the loss or theft of documentation does not appear to
differ significantly between industries.
Industry
52: Finance
61: Educational
62: Health Care
92: Public Admin.
All Others
Total
0
o -o - - . .- a
S- Total
6 16 32 12 16 14 11
9 15 49 9 101 75 8
8 12 52 9 5 17 12
8 29 62 10 25 65 18
7 14 67 16 47 28 15
38 86 262 56 194 199 64 899
Table 6: Observed Values, with Low P-Value Industries Consolidated
U
- o :2 E =
Industry U 0.
52: Finance 4.5 10.2 31.2 6.7 23.1 23.7 7.6
61: Educational 11.2 25.4 77.5 16.6 57.4 58.9 18.9
62: Health Care 4.9 11.0 33.5 7.2 24.8 25.5 8.2
92: Public Admin. 9.2 20.8 63.2 13.5 46.8 48.0 15.4
All Others 8.2 18.6 56.5 12.1 41.9 42.9 13.8
Table 7: Expected Values, with Low P-Value Industries Consolidated
Docs .5116643991
Media .0172283798
Hardware .0001473399
Insider .0344524032
Compromise .0000000001
Processing .0001688209
Disposal .0384812865
Table 8: X' P-Values by Breach Type
107
266
115
217
194
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B. TRENDS
We separated observations by industry and by year in an effort to
compare the trends in breaches from year to year. Figure 4 shows the
results for all observations. Statistical analysis of the trend values is a
work in progress. It is likely that there are not enough observations
per year in many instances to make concrete statements about the
significance of our results.
All Obsvations
AI:Dos 0.7
A2 Media
A3 Hardmere
B4. Insider
B5 Compromis
C6, Processig ----
C7: Disposal
2005 2006 2007
Financial Education
0.7 0.7
0.0 - 0.0
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Medical Government
0.7 0.7
0.0 0.0- -
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Figure 4: Proportion of Breaches in Each Industry by Year
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IV. DISCUSSION
While the bulk of media attention on threats to private
information is given to the activity of outside attackers, these breaches
account for only approximately 22% of the instances in our data set.
More significant is the number and type of breaches caused by people
within an organization. Poor procedures, human errors by staff
(Processing and Disposal), and the malicious activities of people on
the inside of an organization account for greater than 35% of our
observations.
Noteworthy is the finding that the single largest contributor to our
data set comes from the loss and theft of computing hardware. In
many cases there was no way to distinguish lost from stolen, though in
practice the distinction is unimportant. Once a device has left an
organization's control, the organization can no longer rely on the
security of the information that the device contains. It is reasonable
to assume that the majority of these thefts were attempts to acquire
the hardware- thus the data were not the primary target. As the
perceived profitability of information theft increases and the retail
value of laptops declines, it is likely that the proportion of theft
specifically targeting data will increase.
In breach notifications where a computer was stolen, the reporter
often hastens to note that the device was password protected. While
this may serve to ease the fears of the general public, a password does
little to protect the information if the information itself was the thief's
target. Simply attaching the hard drive to another device or booting
the stolen device from alternate media will give the attacker access to
the data. However, proper use of good encryption is an effective
control for data on stolen hardware or electronic media. While
cryptography would not stop the thefts in a case where the hardware is
the target, it could change the incident into one that is resolved by a
simple police report on the value of the hardware or media rather than
a public breach announcement.
An early impetus for this research was a heated debate with a
colleague who argued that the impact of cryptographic controls is
wildly overstated. If one accepts the position that the loss of properly
encrypted data does not constitute a breach, then 38% of all losses
that led to our data, those observations stemming from both lost and
stolen media and hardware, would never have led to disclosures if the
data they contained had been encrypted.
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A. HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
Upon looking at the distribution of breaches across industries
(Table 5), we find the most striking characteristic is the proportion of
lost and stolen hardware events in the Health Care and Social
Assistance sector. At over 45% of reported breaches, physical control
of hardware clearly needs attention. Other forms of loss and theft are
slightly higher in Health Care as well, though we did not get favorable
significance numbers overall for lost and stolen documents, so we
warn against any conclusions drawn from that category from this
analysis.
We had some concern that lost hardware, being such a large
proportion of the data loss in the Health Care industry, might skew
differences in other categories. We removed lost hardware from the
data and regenerated proportions (Table 9) to see what effect this had.
We did not perform any statistical tests on the results, so their
significance is suspect; however, the results give additional support to
a greater proportion of loss and theft of media in Health Care.
0 •
0
Industry _ ___ _
All Industries 5.97 13.50 8.79 30.46 31.24 10.05
62: Health Care 12.70 19.05 14.29 7.94 26.98 19.05
Table 9: Breach Type Percentages Compared Between All
Observations and Health Care and Social Assistance,
with Lost/Stolen Hardware Removed
The relatively small rate of processing errors in the Health Care
sector relative to all industries (15% compared to 22%) may imply an
above average level of attention to the quality of mandated procedures
regarding the handling of information, either through the inherent
culture of the industry, or the impact of HIPAA37 on the procedures in
use. If such procedures exist, they do not adequately address the
improper disposal of documentation, as we observe that Health Care
37 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 11o Stat.
1936 (1996).
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has the highest proportion of improperly disposed documentation, at
nearly 10.5%.
While compromised hosts account for about 22% of all of our data
points, they account for less than 4.5% of the reported breaches in
Health Care. We are led to believe that the industry either has done
an above average job in securing logical access to its systems, or the
industry faces a disproportionate shortfall in detective controls.
B. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
The proportion of compromised hosts in the Educational Services
sector is the polar opposite of that in the Health Care sector. Nearly
38% of all breaches in Education are of this type. Given the large
number of reports in this sector overall, compromised hosts in
Education account for more than 11% of all observations in the full
data set. This may indicate that Education faces a greater proportion
of threats from outside parties seeking to target their computing
infrastructure, a greater proportion of vulnerabilities due to outdated
or unpatched services and missing controls, or some combination of
these issues. Alternatively, it might signal a better than average ability
to detect compromised hosts. Either way, it is likely that the
proportion is significant and worthy of future study.
Though in absolute magnitude Education's processing errors are
the second largest contributor to our data set (8.3% of all
observations), the percentage of breaches of this type does not appear
to deviate significantly from the overall percentage. However, if we
factor compromised hosts out of the category (Table lo), the numbers
lead us to reexamine that conclusion. We have yet to determine the
appropriate test for significance, so these results are as yet
undetermined.
Lost and stolen hardware and media appear to be lower in
Education, though in Table lo the gap closes for media. Insider
misconduct is correspondingly lower than the general case. This
could be attributed to the type of personally identifying information
that an educational institution is likely to maintain. If a criminal's
goal is to steal identities for financial gain, there are probably more
potentially lucrative targets than students. Improper disposal of
sensitive information is also lower in Education. Note, however, that
the differences for insider misconduct and improper disposal may also
be within an as-yet uncalculated margin of error.
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.,.) 0
Industry C) _ _ __ r_)
All Industries 5.39 12.20 37.16 7.94 28.23 9.08
61: Educational 5.45 9.09 29.70 5.45 45.45 19.05
Table 10: Breach Type Percentages Compared Between all Observations
and Educational Services with Compromised Hosts Removed
C. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Public Administration has a disproportionately lower rate of
compromised hosts relative to the overall data set: 11.5% versus 21.5%.
As with Health Care, there are two competing hypotheses. The
numbers imply that either fewer compromises occurred due to a
higher degree of preventative control, or fewer compromises were
reported, possibly because of lower coverage by detective controls. A
specific review of practices and behaviors in Public Administration
relative to other industries would likely clear up the ambiguity.
The proportion of processing errors relative to all industries (30%
as opposed to 22%) in Public Administration is also worth
investigation. Obviously, the sorts of organizations that make up this
sector-the military, law enforcement, public services-will have
greatly different needs and procedures. Further study into the
specifics of these incidents should point to the root cause for these
differences.
D. FINANCE AND INSURANCE
Of our four "statistically significant" data sets, Finance and
Insurance has the least significant p-value (see Table 4), but there
remain a few points of interest worth noting. The Finance and
Insurance industry has the smallest proportion of processing errors,
at 13%. This is not surprising given the high degree of formalization
and regulation of the procedures in the industry as a whole. Also not
surprising, given the type of data the industry uses and its value in
fraud, is that Finance manifests proportionally the highest rate of
insider misconduct. At over x1%, insider misconduct occurs at more
than double the rate in the overall data set.
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E. TRENDS
We have not performed any statistical tests on the trend lines, and
believe that it is likely that the sample size per year may be too small
to draw any meaningful conclusions. Furthermore, having only three
years of data makes it difficult to put much faith in any trend we spot.
We will nonetheless present some preliminary impressions, with the
warning that the information contained in this section may be subject
to personal bias. Caveat lector.
The level of lost and stolen documentation appears to have been
slightly on the rise across years and industries, with the exception of
Finance, the only industry in which the rate of lost and stolen
documentation was lower in 2007 than in 2005. Loss or theft of
media has been increasing slightly in the full data set, though different
industries have been moving in different directions. Most noteworthy
is the precipitous drop in the Finance sector, from more than a
quarter of all reports in 2005, to about 12% in 2007. No industry
presents a clear trend regarding the loss and theft of hardware, though
the steep drop in reports in the Health Care industry may signal a
turnaround in what has been its largest breach type.
There is little clear about trends of insider misconduct, but the
Education sector may be worth watching if its proportion continues to
climb in 2008. The proportion of compromised hosts dropped
significantly from 2005 to 2007, but with the exception of Education,
our statistically significant data sets changed little.
No clear trend is evident in the proportion of processing errors.
There is a pronounced jump in the number of instances of improper
disposal, although we believe this jump is simply due to an increase in
the reporting of discarded documents. Since sensitive data has been
improperly disposed of for as long as there has been paper and
dumpsters, we do not think this is a real trend in incidents, but a trend
in reporting. A large number of the reports in the ITRC collections
detail phone calls to media outlets alerting them to the presence of
documents in public. Numerous laws at the state and federal levels
require the proper disposal of sensitive documentation38 and it is
likely that this topic simply became a popular news item in 2007,
rather than there being any significant increase in processing errors.
38 See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. lO6-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (2006) (codified
as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 2903 and scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C.,
and 18 U.S.C.); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Fair and
Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. lO8-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2464 (2006).
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V. FUTURE WORK
Future work includes the calculation of statistical significance of
the trend lines within industries (Figure 4). Given our impression
that the sample count may be too low to give an accurate accounting,
our discussion of trends will be limited.
Undoubtedly, data breaches will be with us for some time,
providing more data for analysis in the future. Inclusion of those data
will help boost our confidence in our statistical analysis.
